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Abstract: This paper examines the impact of corruption on foreign direct investment inflows for ten 
Central and Eastern European states. The paper attempts to answer the question: what is the role of corruption 
in attracting foreign direct investments? Using the data from UNCTAD for foreign direct investment and 
Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International, for a period of 12 years, 2000-2012, we 
evaluate the specific impact of corruptions on FDI using GDP as control variable. Our results confirm the 
majority of literature and show a negative significant relation between the variables analyzed, but at a lower 
intensity than expected. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Taking into consideration the CEE states, after the 1989 moment, foreign direct investment was 
seen as the best solution for national economic development. As Dunning (1993, p. 20), for example, 
has  argued  that  multinational  companies  „are  uniquely  able  to  supply  many  of  the  necessary 
ingredients for economic growth, a reshaping of attitudes to work and wealth creation, the redesigning 
of the business  and legal framework, especially with  respect to property rights  and contractual 
relationship”.  
Institutions have an essential role in setting the „rules of game” by which individuals interact 
in a market economy (North, 1990), especially by ensuring the competiveness of markets. 
After the 1989 events, the countries from Eastern Europe looked at foreign examples in building 
its institutions and reforming their economies. Still, new institutions were created without taking into 
to consideration that the distinct cultural and systematic inheritance influences especially informal 
institutions such as norm and values. In many countries weak legal framework permitted a large extent 
of opportunistic behavior, bribery and corruption (Nelson et al., 1998).  
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Looking at the literature that examines in which extent the quality of institutions plays an 
important role in the development of an economy we found conflicting results. In general, many 
studies demonstrated that bad governance fosters corruption and can lead to inefficient allocation of 
resources and impede economic progress. Many authors, such as Gyimah-Brempong (2002), Mo 
(2001), Li et al. (2000) and Mauro (1995) had found that corruption has significant adverse effects 
on economic growth. 
Corruption can also create obstacles to doing business, according to World Bank (2002), deter 
foreign direct investment flows (Wei, 2000), cause misallocations of public expenditures (Mauro, 
1997; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997) or reduce rates of investment. 
There are many ways in which corruption can impact on economic behaviour and impose 
economic losses on society: it can damage incentives and destroy opportunities; it can distort price 
signals and deplete resources; and it can create uncertainty and compromise public policy. 
Our study presents the effect of corruption and market potential on foreign direct investment 
for 10 Eastern European countries for a period of 12 years. The results show that the level of 
corruption deters foreign investment inflows. 
The research has the following structure. Section 1 presents the theoretical approach on foreign 
direct investment, corruptions and a short literature review of econometric studies on the subject. 
Methodological aspects and results are presented in Section 2 and conclusions in Section 3. 
 
1.  THEORETICAL APPROACH ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, 
CORRUPTION  
 
1.1. Determinants of FDI 
 
The process of economic globalization appears in the form of international trade in goods in 
services,  short-term  capital  movements  among  countries  and  a  rapid  increase  in  foreign  direct 
investment (FDI). FDI refer to long term cross-border investment with a substantial influence both 
on receiving country and on the investing multinational company. 
Two main types of determinant factors: the gravity factors and the policy related factors are 
suggested by the empirical literature regarding the determinants of FDI. The gravity factors refer to 
issues such as market size and the proximity of the host country to the source country and have been 
found to explain a big part of FDI flows. Policy related factors regard overall macroeconomic  
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stability, trade policies (trade costs, openness degree), fiscal policies (average taxation rate or the 
fiscal  burden,  tax  incentive),  labour  policies  (labour  costs  and  skills),  the  degree  of  regional 
integration, infrastructure and institutions. 
Concerning the magnitude and sign of FDI determinants for Central and Eastern European 
States, many of the studies show ambiguous results when analyzed the mode of entry, the type of FDI 
or the target industry. 
Regarding to the relation between determinants of FDI, the table below summarize some 
empirical studies: 
 
Table 1 - Determinants of foreign direct investment 
Variables 
Sign of the relation 
Positive  Negative  Insignificant 
GDP/capita 
Schneider and Frey 
(1985) 
Birsan and Buiga 
(2009)  
Jaspersen et al. (2000)  Wei (2000) 
Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias (2000) 
Political risk 
  Schneider and Frey (1985) 
Edwards (1990) 
Gastanaga et al. (1998) 
Moosa and Cardak (2006) 
Loree and Guisinger (1995) 
Jaspersen et al. (2000) 
Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias (2000) 
Corruption 
Eagger and Winner 
(2005)  
Wei (2000)  Akcay (2001) 
Source: author representation based on the studies presented. 
 
The available empirical findings based on EU countries make it difficult to draw general 
conclusions about the source of heterogeneity in the determinants of FDI for Central and Eastern 
European countries.  
 
1.2. FDI and corruption 
 
It is a large debate surrounding the definition of corruption, many authors expressing different 
approaches on the subject. The narrowest approach specifies that corruption is „the use of public 
office for private gain”. 
The abuse of not only the public office but also the private or commercial takes part of the broad 
approach.   
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Theoretically, we must distinguish between „grabbing hand” and „helping hand” influences of 
corruption on inward FDI.  
In the short run, corruption raises the cost of a firm’s foreign investment, since (i) firms have 
to pay bribes (similar to taxes), (ii) they are engaged in resource-wasting rent seeking activities 
(Applebaum and Katz, 1987; Murphy et al., 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), and (iii) they have to 
bear additional contract-related risks, because corruption contracts are not enforceable in courts 
(Boycko et al., 1995). Corruption in the host country thus acts as a grabbing hand, reducing the profits 
of firms and therefore lowering a firm’s incentives to invest abroad. 
Further, corruption reduces the productivity of public inputs (infrastructure) which, in turn, 
decreases a country’s locational attractiveness (Bardhan, 1997; Rose-Ackermann, 1999; Lambsdorff, 
2003). On the other hand, multinational firms might be willing to accept paying bribes in order (i) to 
speed up the bureaucratic processes to obtain the legal permissions for setting up a foreign plant (Lui, 
1985), and (ii) to gain access to publicly funded projects (Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000). In this case, 
corruption acts as a helping hand, increasing profits of multinational firms. If the revenue effects 
outweigh the cost effects, corruption is expected to increase FDI. In the presence of pre-existing 
government and/or bureaucratic failures, however, corruption may be efficiency-enhancing (Bardhan, 
1997; Aidt, 2003). Corruption then may also be rent-creating, with the rents from controls over 
foreign investment shared by corrupt officials and foreign investors. Glass and Wu (2002) focus on 
the impact of corruption on FDI in  a general  equilibrium model with Northern innovation and 
Southern imitation (Grossman and Helpman, 1991).  
Multinational firms are vertically organized and shift their production to the low cost country. 
The firms bear the risk of illegal imitation of their innovations, and of the requirement to pay bribes 
to public officials. Analyzing four types of bribes (bribes on sales or profits as well as repeated and 
one-time bribes in order to obtain a permission to sell in the foreign market), Glass and Wu (2002) 
demonstrate that the general equilibrium effects of corruption on FDI are in principle ambiguous, and 
conclude (Glass and Wu, 2002, p. 19) that „corruption need not be bad for FDI..., but rather corruption 
may foster inward FDI”. 
 
2.  ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 
Our model is based on theoretical approach found in academic literature. In order to isolate the 
effect of corruption on foreign direct investment we also use control variables such as GDP.  
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??𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = ? + ?1?𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + ?2??𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
where ?? is the country subscript, ?? is the time subscript, 𝜷?? are unknown parameters to be 
estimated, 𝜺??,?? is the usual random disturbance term. All independent variables are lagged one year in 
order to avoid simultaneity with the dependent variable and taking into account that decisions to 
invest abroad take time. 
 
2.1. Data variables 
 
FDI inflows are drawn from UNCTAD database for 10 countries form Central and Eastern 
Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia. 
In the examination of corruption the most used measure is the Corruptions Perceptions Index 
(CPI) reported annually by Transparency International. This non-governmental organization studies 
corruption since 1995 looking to draw attention on the damage caused by corruption and to stimulate 
governments to adopt and implement anti-corruption regulations. The CPI ranges from zero (totally 
corrupt) to ten (absence of corruption). The index is based on surveys filled by specialists and 
calculated annually for a wide range of countries. 
We also use as control variable the real GDP for the countries analyzed.  
The table below shows the variables used in our analysis.  
 
Table 2 - Description of the variables 
Measure  Data Source(s)  Calculation  Observed 
Foreign  direct  investment 
(FDI) 
Inward  of  foreign  direct 
investment in millions USD 
Log FDI  2000-2011 
Corruption  Perception  Index 
(CPI) 
Transparency  International 
draws on 13 data sources from 
11  globally  dispersed 
institutions  for  this  index.  It 
ranges from 0 to 10, with high 
values  indicating  absence  of 
corruption*. 
The  CPI  is  a  composite 
index using data compiled 
or published between 2000 
and  2001  for  the  2001 
measure. Specifically, it is 
computed as an unweighted 
average of all estimates for 
a  particular  country. 
Currently,  183  countries 
are assessed. 
2000-2011 
GDP  –  proxy  for  market 
potential 
UNCTAD database  real  GDP  in  millions  US 
dollars 
2000-2011 
*Transparency International Methodology, question 8, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/in_detail 
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2.2. Results and interpretation 
 
Our analysis uses the multivariate regression technique.  
The results show that, according to the Correlations table, between foreign direct investment 
and the perceived corruption is a negative significant relation, respectively a rise in the perception of 
corruption for the countries analyzed deter the expected inflows of FDI for the next years. 
Also it can be noticed a moderate direct relation between market potential and foreign direct 
investment received by the Central and Eastern European countries.  
This founding can be explained by the inclusion in the sample analyzed of the Baltic states who 
have a small GDP compared with the rest of the sample and high levels of foreign direct investment.  
 
Correlations matrix 
  FDI  CPI_1  GDP_1 
Pearson Correlation 
FDI  1.000  -.269  .646 
CPI_1  -.269  1.000  -.105 
GDP_1  .646  -.105  1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
FDI  .  .001  .000 
CPI_1  .001  .  .127 
GDP_1  .000  .127  . 
N 
FDI  120  120  120 
CPI_1  120  120  120 
GDP_1  120  120  120 
Source: author calculations using SPSS 17. 
 
Table bellow shows that the model chosen for our analysis is significant ( .Sig<.005) and 
adequate.  
Still, the Model Summary table shows that our model could be improved in order to have better 
values of R and R square by adding other institutional variables in equation beside corruption like 
democracy, government stability, law and order, democracy and the quality of bureaucracy. 
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Model Summary 
Model  R  R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1  df2  Sig. F 
Change 
1  .677a  .458  .449  3327.20174  .458  49.428  2  117  .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), GDP_1, CPI_1 
Source: author calculations using SPSS 17. 
 
The qualitative assessment of the impact of corruption on FDI for the countries analyzed 
confirms the results of empirical analysis. 
First of all, the figure 1 shows that Romania and Bulgaria are considered highly corrupted 
countries. The evolution of the perceived corruption improved over time only for Romania, while 
Bulgaria marked a decrease of the CPI Index. Regarding to FDI inflows attracted by Romania and 
Bulgaria we can observe that are correlated with the evolution of CPI index. The decrease of the 
measure of corruption (meaning a rise in the perceived corruption (0-highly corrupted to 10 – very 
clean)), correspond with lower values of FDI inflows in the next year. 
 
Figure 1 - The evolution of FDI and CPI for Romania and Bulgaria 
 
Source: UNCTAD and Transparency International. 
 
Baltic States, Slovakia and Slovenia show the same evolution as Romania and Bulgaria (see 
figure 2). Still, we must mention that Lithuania, Slovakia and Latvia are perceived as more corrupted 
countries than Slovenia and Estonia. We must mention that the most free of corruption country of 
ECEC is Estonia with a CPI score higher than 6.0. 
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The highest level of FDI inflows are attracted by Slovakia even if the CPI index shows the 
lowest levels for the countries analyzed. These results can be explained by the active policy promoted 
by the Slovak government for attracting foreign direct investors (mainly fiscal incentives). 
 
Figure 2 - The evolution of FDI and CPI for Baltic States, Slovakia and Slovenia 
 
Source: UNCTAD and Transparency International. 
 
Analyzing Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic we can observe a mainly indirect relation 
between foreign direct investments and CPI. Czech Republic and Hungary have a particularly trend 
of the perceived corruption showing the same evolution. After a period of reforms and concrete efforts 
in reducing corruption, the emergence of the economic crises in 2008 marked decreases in the levels 
of corruption perception index and in FDI inflows. 
Poland stands alone in the group (see figure 3). We can see that even if the effect of the 
economic crises reflects in the levels of FDI inflows, the perceived corruption is constantly improving 
from 2005 to 2011. 
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Figure 3. The evolution of FDI and CPI for Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic 
 
Source: UNCTAD and Transparency International. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
FDI  receiving  host  countries  expect  foreign  investments  to  support  economic  growth, 
competitiveness, employment and technological progress. For Central and Eastern European states it 
was also an expectation regarding the transition process and improve efficiency. But the transition 
from centralized economy to market orientated states showed many challenges handled by each 
country analyzed in her way. One of these challenges proved to be the emergence of systematic 
corruption.  
Our analysis focuses on the impact of corruption on foreign direct investment flows attracted 
by ECE countries. Using as determinants the CPI index and GDP, our results show a negative 
significant relation between corruption and FDI and a mild positive significant relation between GDP 
and FDI. These results can be explained by the fact that the foreign direct investors decide to invest 
or not after a complex analysis of the business environment. So, we can affirm that for Central and 
Eastern European states the impact of market potential, although high, is diminished by the other 
factors related with stability and predictability of the regulatory system. Regarding the perceived 
corruption, our analysis show that are impetuous necessary reforms of public administration in order 
to reduce all the forms of corruption and bribery. Again, Romania, a highly corrupted country after 
Transparency International methodology, needs coherent reforms in reducing corruption and in the 
same time increase the country locational attractiveness for foreign direct investors. 
5,5
0,0
1,0
2,0
3,0
4,0
5,0
6,0
0,00
5000,00
10000,00
15000,00
20000,00
25000,00
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
C
o
r
r
u
p
t
i
o
n
 
 
P
e
r
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
I
n
d
e
x
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
D
i
r
e
c
t
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
Czech Republic Poland Hungary 
CES Working Papers – Volume V, Issue 3 
 
 
320 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This work was supported by the European Social Fund in Romania, under the responsibility of 
the Managing Authority for the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 
2007-2013 [grant POSDRU/CPP 107/DMI 1.5/S/78342]. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Aidt, T. S. (2003) Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey, The Economic Journal, Vol. 113, 
Issue 491, pp. 632–652. 
Akçay, S. (2001) Is Corruption an Obstacle for Foreign Investors in Developing Countries? A Cross-
Country Evidence, Yapi Kredi Economic Review, vol.12, no.2, pp. 27–34. 
Appelbaum, E., Katz, E. (1987) Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political Economy of Rent 
Seeking, Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Vol. 97, Issue 387, pp. 685-699. 
Bardhan, P. (1997) Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, Journal of Economic Literature, 
vol. XXXV (September), pp. 1320-1346. 
Bevan, A., A., Estrin, S. (2000) The determinants of FDI in transition economies, Discussion Paper 
No.2638, Center for Economic Policy Research, London. 
Birsan, M., Buiga, A. (2009) FDI determinants: Case of Romania, Transition Studies Review, vol. 
15, issue 4, pp. 726-736. 
Boycko,  M.,  Shleifer,  A.,  Vishny,  R.  (1995)  Mass  privatisation  in  Russia,  in:  OECD,  Mass 
privatization: An initial assessment, OECD, Paris. 
Dunning,  J.  H.  (1993)  Multinational  enterprises  and  the  global  economy,  Addision-Wesley, 
Wokingham. 
Egger, P., Winner H. (2005) Evidence on corruption as an incentive for foreign direct investment, 
European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 21, issue 4, December 2005, pp. 932-952.   
Gastanaga, V., Nugent, J., Pashamiova, B. (1998) Host Country Reforms and FDI Inflows: How Much 
Difference Do They Make?, World Development, vol.26, no.7, pp. 1299-1314. 
Glass, A. J., Wu, X. (2002) Does Corruption Discourage Foreign Direct Investment and Innovation?, 
Department of Economics, Texas A&M University.  
CES Working Papers – Volume V, Issue 3 
 
 
321 
Grossman G., Helpman E. (1991) Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
Gyimah-Brempong,  K.  (2002)  Corruption,  Economic  Growth  and  Income  Inequality  in  Africa, 
Economics of Governance, vol.3, issue 3, pp. 183-209. 
Hausmann, R., Fernández-Arias, E. (2000) Foreign Direct Investment: Good Cholesterol?, Inter-
American Development Bank, Working Paper No. 417, Washington. 
Jaspersen, S., Aylward, A., Knox, A. (2000) The Effects of Risks on Private Investment: Africa 
Compared with Other Developing Areas in P. Collier and C. Pattillo (eds.) Investments and 
Risks in Africa, Saint Patrick Press, New York, pp. 71-95. 
Lambsdorff, J. G. (2003) How Corruption Affects Productivity, Kyklos, vol. 56, issue 4, pp. 457–474. 
Li, H., Xu, C., Zou, H.-F. (2000) Corruption, Income Distribution, and Growth, Economics and 
Politics, vol.12, issue 2, pp. 155-182. 
Loree D. W., Guisinger S. (1995) Policy and Non-policy Determinants of U.S. equity Foreign Direct 
Investment, Journal of International Business Studies, vol.26, issue 2, pp. 281-299.  
Lui, F.T. (1985) An equilibrium queuing model of bribery, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 93, 
issue 4, pp. 760–781. 
Mauro, P. (1995) Corruption and Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.110, issue 3, pp. 681-
712. 
Mauro, P. (1997) The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure: A 
Cross Country Analysis in Kimberly Ann Elliott (ed.) Corruption and the Global Economy, 
Institute for International Economics. 
Mo, H. (2001) Corruption and Economic Growth, Journal of Comparative Economics, vol.29, issue 
1, pp. 66-79. 
Moosa, I. A., Cardak, B. (2006) The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: An Extreme Bounds 
Analysis, Journal of Multinational Financial Management, vol.16, issue 2, pp. 199–211. 
Murphy, K., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (1993) Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?, American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, vol. 83, no. 2. 
Nelson, J. M., Tilley, C., Walker, L. (1998) Transforming post-communist political economies: Task 
force on economies in transition, National Research Council, National Academy Press,  
North,  D.  (1990)  Institutions,  Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance,  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
CES Working Papers – Volume V, Issue 3 
 
 
322 
Rose-Ackerman,  S.  (1999)  Corruption  and  government:  Causes,  consequences,  and  reform, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Schneider, F., Frey, B.S. (1985) Economic and political determinants of foreign direct investments, 
World development, vol.13, no. 2, pp. 161-175. 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (1993) Corruption, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.108, no.3, pp.599-
617.  
Tanzi, V., Davoodi, H. (1997) Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth, IMF Working Paper, 
97/139. 
Tanzi, V., Davoodi, H. (2000) Corruption, Growth, and Public Finances, IMF Working Paper No. 
00/182. 
Wei, S.-J. (2000a) How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, vol.82, no.1, pp. 1-11. 
***Transparency International Reports, Corruption Perception Index for 2000-2011 available at 
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview, accessed on July 2013. 
***UNCTADStat,  available  at  http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders 
.aspx?sRF_Act ivePath=P,5,27&sRF_Expanded=,P,5,27 accessed on 01 July 2013. 
   